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Child maintenance (planned)

What the model does today

For child maintenance that is the right answer for UC:

The paying-parent side of this asymmetry is the work-incentive problem described by the Centre for Social Justice in The Hidden Parent Poverty Trap: Child Maintenance and Universal Credit. The model reproduces UC’s side of it, because neither child maintenance variable reaches UC. It does not reproduce the combined marginal rates, because maintenance_expenses is a fixed input that does not rise with earnings.

Scope

Phases 1 and 2: separate the inputs and count spousal maintenance

Done in the engine by #2572. What remains is in the data: datasets that put the FRS payments from an absent partner in private_transfer_income should move them to spousal_maintenance_income (policyengine-uk-data#627; Microcosm UK). Datasets that do not supply it keep today’s results.

Phase 3: model the CMS calculation

Derive the CMS weekly amount when the inputs are available, from the paying parent’s gross weekly income (GOV.UK; Child Support Act 1991 Sch. 1):

Paying parent’s gross weekly incomeRateWeekly amount
Below £7Nil£0
£7 to £100, or on benefitsFlat£7
£100.01 to £199.99ReducedFormula
£200 to £3,000Basic12% / 16% / 19% of income up to £800 for 1 / 2 / 3+ children, then 9% / 12% / 15% of income from £800 to £3,000
Above £3,000Basic, cappedIncome above £3,000 is ignored; the receiving parent can apply to the courts
Not enough informationDefault£39 / £51 / £64 (SI 2012/2677 reg. 49; GOV.UK’s guide shows £38 for one child)

Then:

The income bands are fixed in legislation, not uprated each year.

Phase 3 is optional for UC analysis, which needs only Phases 1 and 2. It allows reforms to the CMS rates or bands to be scored.

Implementation outline

Parameters under gov/cms/

Variables under variables/gov/cms/

Data needs

References