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PolicyEngine vs Resolution Foundation nowcasting

The Resolution Foundation (RF) publishes a UK microsimulation nowcast as part of its Living Standards Outlook and pre-budget previews. RF documents its methodology in the LSO appendix; PolicyEngine’s approach is spread across this repo, policyengine-uk-data, and the parameters under gov/economic_assumptions/. This page summarises how the two approaches differ at a high level so users can interpret discrepancies between the two nowcasts.

For a focused write-up of how PolicyEngine generates the economic growth factors, see growthfactors.md.

Common ground

Both PolicyEngine and RF start from the same survey backbone — the Family Resources Survey (FRS) plus its companion datasets (HBAI) — and project it forward using a mix of:

In broad strokes both nowcasts produce gross-to-net household incomes and participation-weighted programme spending consistent with OBR-published totals over the next two-to-three fiscal years.

Where the methodologies diverge

Earnings growth

AspectResolution FoundationPolicyEngine UK
Wage floorModels the National Living Wage / NMW explicitly each year, lifting anyone below their age-appropriate minimum to the floor.Earnings are uprated by the OBR average-earnings index without an explicit floor; minimum wage uprating is held in gov/hmrc/minimum_wage/ and only enters when a reform invokes it.
SpilloversIncludes a spillover effect for workers just above the wage floor (compression of the lower wage distribution).No automatic spillover; earnings shift uniformly with the OBR index.
NLW extensionsModels the 2024-25 extension of the NLW to 21- and 22-year-olds, and provisionally the 2029-30 extension to 18-20-year-olds.NLW age bands are encoded in parameters (gov/hmrc/minimum_wage) but extensions only flow into outputs if a household’s wage actually falls below the modelled floor — there is no explicit re-anchoring of earnings.
Beyond 2025-26Assumes the wage floor grows in line with average earnings.Same effective behaviour, but driven by uprating rather than a wage-floor rule.

Practical implication. Low-paid workers’ incomes can grow faster under the RF nowcast than under PolicyEngine because the wage floor binds and ripples up; PolicyEngine treats them like everyone else under the OBR earnings index.

Benefit uprating

AspectResolution FoundationPolicyEngine UK
Working-age benefitsUses statutory uprating with explicit overrides for announced policy (e.g. CoL Payments, benefit freezes).Same approach. Parameters under gov/dwp/ and gov/hmrc/child_benefit/ track legislated rates; ad hoc payments live under gov/treasury/cost_of_living_support.
State PensionModels the triple lock explicitly, using its own internal earnings/CPI forecasts.Models the triple lock from its statutory inputs (September CPI, May-July AWE total pay growth, 2.5% floor) in gov/economic_assumptions/statutory_uprating_inputs/ and gov/dwp/state_pension/triple_lock/, forecast from the OBR’s September CPI and Q2 earnings growth to the end of the EFO and calendar-year growth after; see the State Pension page.

Take-up

AspectResolution FoundationPolicyEngine UK
ApproachUses HMRC/DWP outturn take-up rates and aligns simulated caseloads to published totals via calibration.Same: each means-tested benefit has a *_takeup_rate parameter populated stochastically into would_claim_* flags in policyengine-uk-data, and the reweighting step in policyengine-uk-data enforces caseload alignment.

Calibration / reweighting

AspectResolution FoundationPolicyEngine UK
TargetsAligns to a mix of HMRC, DWP and ONS aggregates.Aligns to the same family of targets, but is publicly documented in policyengine-uk-data (targets/) and includes finer-grained local-authority targets for council tax and rents (see policyengine-uk-data/datasets/local_areas/).

Horizon

Interpreting discrepancies

When PolicyEngine and RF disagree on a published statistic (e.g. relative poverty, fiscal cost of a reform), the main sources of difference tend to be:

  1. Wage-floor handling — concentrated in low-pay groups (young workers, hospitality, retail). RF nowcasts higher real earnings growth here.

  2. Take-up calibration vintage — both models drift between official take-up statistics releases; align to the same vintage before comparing.

  3. Local-area targets — PolicyEngine’s calibration includes LA-level rent and council tax targets that the public RF nowcast does not, which can shift housing-cost and disposable-income distributions.

  4. Long-run horizon — beyond 2030 the divergence widens because the two models use different long-run rules; treat post-2030 figures as illustrative rather than authoritative.

References